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FIU 1995 CUBA POLL
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The 1995 Cuba Poll, conducted by the Institute of Public
Opinion Research (IPOR) of Florida International University and the
Cuban Research Institute, measured the level of support within the
Cuban-American community in Dade County, Florida and Union City,
New Jersey, for policies directed toward Cuba. Funding from the
ARCA Foundation permitted the investigators to expand the range of
the poll. This poll, conducted between February 7 to March 14,
consisted of 1504 random interviews with Cuban Americans in the two
areas with the largest concentration of Cuban-Americans. One
thousand and two interviews were completed in Dade County and five
hundred and two in Union City. The increased size of the poll also
permits a complete analysis of various demographic categories
within Dade County as well as allowing for a thorough comparison of
the two communities.
The first Cuba Poll was conducted four years ago, in March of
1991. Subsequent polls were conducted in October of 1991 and in
June of 1993. As in the three previous polls, the researchers this
time found a diversity of opinions on what policies would
facilitate political changes on the island. The consistency of
some of the responses, as well as the shift in others, present us
with the most complete picture to date of the Cuban-American
political attitudes towards Cuba. While most of the responses were
consistent with the previous survey, the most recent poll uncovered
interesting shifts in some significant attitudes toward foreign
policy options as well as highlighted some important opinions
regarding current U.S. policy towards Cuba and Cuban refugees. In
general terms, the findings can be summarized as follows.
* There appears to be an increasing frustration about the lack
of political change occurring on the island and the growing
acceptance that desired changes are not likely to occur
anytime soon.
* At the same time, a sizable minority of respondents continue
to signal that they would support a dialogue with the Cuban
government. In the context of the other responses, this
consistent desire can be interpreted as signifying that among
some within the Cuban-American community in the United States
such a dialogue is seen as important in bringing about a rapid
change to the island as well as bringing about the end of the
Castro era in Cuba.
* In general, the Cuban-American residents of Union City are
more likely to support negotiated solutions to the Cuban
problem than the Dade County residents. Union City residents
were significantly more supportive of the strategies
emphasizing negotiation to bring about change expressed.
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* Respondents who left Cuba after 1970 are more likely to
support negotiated solutions than those arriving during the
1960s. In fact, the more recent the departure from Cuba, the
more likely that the respondent will support negotiated
solutions.
* Similarly, there seems to be a considerable generational
division on the questions raised by the survey. Younger
respondents are more likely to support negotiated solutions
without combining them with pressure strategies.
* Both populations expressed strong support for the
continuation or tightening of the embargo and increasing
international economic pressure.
* Within each population there is a large percentage which
supports pressure strategies in combination with negotiated
strategies. For example, 71% of Dade County and 67% of U.City
respondents who support a dialoque also support tightening the
embargo.
* Echoing the results of the other surveys, the Cuban-American
community is willing to lend support to human rights groups
working inside Cuba.
* A sizable majority (68%) of Cuban Americans are willing to
enter into negotiations with the Cuban government to
facilitate free elections on the island. This position forms
part of the political agenda of some moderate exile
organizations.
* Only 7.4% of the respondents belong to organizations
directly involved in Cuban issues and of these only 4.2%
consider themselves active members.
* There continues to be support for initiating military action
by exile groups or a U.S. invasion of the island.
*There is also a desire to travel to the island but strong
support of the recently initiated travel ban. A majority in
both regions support the recently imposed policy of banning
travel to Cuba (Dade: 66% U. City: 53%).
* Similarly, a majority in both regions support the recently
imposed policy forbidding the sending of money to relatives in
Cuba (Dade: 59% U. City: 52%).
* A large majority in both regions reports that a local
candidate's position on Cuba is important in determining their
vote (Dade: 70% U. City: 79%).
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* A large majority in both regions feels that all points of
view on how to deal with Castro should be heard (Dade: 61%
U. City: 70%).
* A minority in both regions feels that the Republican
election gains will make the end of Fidel Castro's rule happen
sooner (Dade: 34% U. City: 33%).
+ A minority in both regions believes that the Republicans
will make it easier for Cubans to immigrate to the U.S. (Dade
County: 29% U. City: 30%).
* Approximately one third in both regions considers the U.S.
decision to send rafters to Guantanamo to be the correct
decision to be made at the time (Dade: 36% U. City: 32%).
+ A large majority believes that now the Guantanamo and Panama
camp residents should be allowed to come to the U.S. (Dade:
83% U. City: 83%).
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FINDINGS
ANTICIPATION OF POLITICAL CHANGES IN CUBA
The survey results indicate that Cuban-Americans have become
less certain about when major political changes will occur in Cuba.
While in 1991 approximately 54% of respondents expected changes to
occur within one year and an overwhelming 88% anticipated changes
in five years or less, only 41% of the current respondents expect
major changes within the next five years.
+ Only 14 percent expect major political changes to occur in
Cuba within one year while an additional 27 percent anticipate
that major changes are more than one year but less than five
years away.
** Dade County: 15% within one year and 26% between one and
five years.
** Union City: 13% within one year and 27% between one and
five years.
* In a marked increase of pessimism, 20% of the sample
believes that desired changes will never occur in Cuba.
** Dade County: 18%
** Union City: 22%
The older respondents are more likely to consider political
changes in Cuba imminent (within one year). Yet, younger
respondents are more optimistic that change will occur within the
next nine years. Similarly, significantly more respondents who
oppose a dialogue believe that changes will occur within one year
but more of those favoring a dialogue believe that changes will
occur within two to five years.
POLICIES SUPPORTED TO PROMOTE POLITICAL CHANGE IN CUBA
The Cuban-American community supports a variety of policies to
promote political changes on the island. Within the general
patterns there are some variances associated with particular
groups. The cross tabulations included in this report divide
responses according to seven variables: gender, age, year
respondent left Cuba, education, income level, position on a
dialogue with the Cuban government and political party affiliation.
Please refer to these tabulations for complete details on the
differences between respondents belonging to each group. Here, we
will highlight the general responses of the populations based on
their level of support for specific policies. If we look at the
rank order of support from the all of the respondents that voiced
an opinion, the following order emerges.
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* 92 percent favor supporting human rights groups working
inside Cuba.
** Dade County: 92%
** Union City: 93%
There is an extremely high level of support for this policy
across categories in all groups. Within each group, all
response categories fall within five percentage points of each
other except in the questions measuring departure from Cuba
and position on the dialogue issue. The most recent arrivals
(since 1980) exhibit stronger support for this position.
+ 84 percent favor increasing international economic pressure
on Cuba.
** Dade County: 86%
** Union City: 80%
All groupings exhibited high support for this policy option,
with the strongest support coming from those arriving in the
decade of the 60s and well educated, affluent (over $50,000)
respondents who also oppose a dialogue (91% of all respondents
who oppose a dialogue favor this policy).
+ 83 percent favor negotiations with the Cuban government to
allow Cuban family members to ioin relatives living here.
** Dade County: 80%
** Union City: 89%
The respondents belonging to the younger age categories, the
most recent arrivals and those supporting a dialogue were more
likely to support this position.
+ 82 percent favor the tightening of the trade embargo.
** Dade County: 84%
** Union City: 77%
Respondents older than twenty five, respondents who left Cuba
in the 1960s and 1970s and those opposing the dialogue are
most likely to support a tightening of the embargo.
* 82 percent favor negotiations to improve the human rights
conditions on the island.
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** Dade County: 80%
** Union City: 86%
All respondent categories exhibited high support for this
policy option. The younger, more recently arrived
respondents, as well as the better educated, more affluent
agree on this alternative. (92% of all respondents favoring a
dialogue also favor this policy.)
+ 74 percent favor U.S. support of an armed internal rebellion
to overthrow the Cuban government. (04)
** Dade County: 74%
** Union City: 73%
The young males are more likely to favor support of an armed
internal rebellion as well as those having left Cuba during
the decade of the 1960s.
* 73 percent favor maintaining the current policy of no
diplomatic relations and no trade with Cuba.
** Dade County: 77%
** Union City: 66%
The older age groups and those opposing a dialogue are most
likely to support this position.
* 73 percent favor military action by the exile community
against the Cuban government.
** Dade County: 73%
** Union City: 72%
The respondents most supportive of this position are those not
having graduated from high school, and those opposing a
dialogue.
+ 68 percent favor starting negotiations with the Cuban
government to facilitate peaceful democratic change by means
of free-elections or plebiscite.
** Dade County: 63%
** Union City: 79%
The younger age groups, those having left Cuba after 1970, the
higher income and educational categories and those in favor of
a dialogue are the respondents most likely to support this
initiative.
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+ 68 percent favor the starting of negotiations with the Cuban
government to allow regular phone communications with the
island.
** Dade County: 65%
** Union City: 74%
The younger respondents, along with those having left Cuba
after 1970 and particularly since 1980 are the most likely to
support such an initiative.
* 65 percent favor negotiations to exclude medicines from the
trade embargo.
** Dade County: 62%
** Union City: 71%
The youngest respondents (18-24), those who left Cuba during
the 1980s or 1990s, women, lower income individuals and those
who support a dialogue are most likely to support this
position.
* 57 percent favor a United States invasion of Cuba.
** Dade County: 59%
** Union City: 54%
Respondents in the higher income levels, along with those
that left Cuba before between 1950 and 1970, ages 25-44 and
over 65 are the most likely supporters of this position.
* 46 percent favor the establishment of a national dialogue
between Cuban exiles. Cuban dissidents. and representatives
of the Cuban Government.
** Dade County: 40%
** Union City: 57%
Women, respondents in the younger age brackets, those leaving
Cuba after 1970, high school and college graduates and the
higher income categories (especially the over $30,000 group)
are the strongest supporters of a dialogue.
* 43 percent favor negotiations to allow unrestricted travel
by Cuban-Americans to the island to visit relatives.
** Dade County: 37%
** Union City: 56%
The younger respondents, those having left Cuba after 1970
and those favoring a dialogue are the most likely supporters
of this policy initiative.
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* 34 percent favor negotiations to exclude food from the
trade embargo.
** Dade County: 28%
** Union City: 45%
The youngest respondents (18-24), those who left Cuba in the
1980s, those with a higher income and those who support a
dialogue are most likely to support this position.
* 24 percent favor negotiations to allow unrestricted trade
with Cuba.
** Dade County: 18%
** Union City: 34%
Women, arrivals since 1970, lower educational categories, and
those supporting a dialogue are most likely to approve of
this option. (94% of the respondents opposing a dialogue also
oppose this option.)
CHANGES IN PERSONAL PLANS IF CUBA'S GOVERNMENT CHANGES TO A DESIRED
DEMOCRACY
Another set of questions were designed to measure the
potential movement of Cubans between Miami and the island when
certain changes are perceived to have taken place in Cuban.
* 92 percent would be likely to return to visit the island if
the country's government changed to more democratic form of
government.
** Dade County: 93%
** Union City: 92%
* 46 percent of respondents would be likely to travel to Cuba
if all travel restrictions were lifted.
** Dade County: 40%
** Union City: 57%
* 39 percent felt that relatives on the island would come to
the United States to live if Cuba had a democratic
government.
** Dade County: 38%
** Union City: 42%
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Domestic Spill Over Effect
One section of the questionnaire is designed to measure some
of the impact that the Cuba issue might have on domestic electoral
concerns. One of the most significant results of the domestic
spill over effect of the Cuban-American communities' concern with
Cuba is their high registration in the Republican Party. As
mentioned above, 37 percent of the respondents are registered
Republicans and 11 percent are registered Democrats with the
Republicans being most numerous in Dade County (40% to 31%) and
twice as many Democrats being registerd in Union City (16% to 8%).
Analysts have signaled this political alignment, not typical of the
Hispanic population in the United States, to be a result of the
Cuban concern for foreign policy issues. Cubans became involved in
politics initially to influence Washington's position towards Cuba.
Achiving local power is a result of this initial commitment.
The polls discern some other dimensions of the spill-over
effect on Cuban-American political culture.
+ Seventy three percent say that in local political
elections, a candidate's position on Cuba is important in
determining their vote.
** Dade County: 70%
** Union City: 79%
+ Sixty four percent feel that all points of view on how to
deal with Castro should be heard.
** Dade County: 61%
** Union City: 70%
+ Thirty four percent of the respondents felt that the
Republican election gains will make the end of Fidel Castro's
rule happen sooner. Forty nine percent say that Republicans
will make no difference in this outcome.
** Dade County: 34% sooner
** Union City: 33%
+ Thirty percent believe that the Republicans will make it
easier for Cubans to immigrate to the U.S. while thirty three
percent believe they will make it harder.
** Dade County: 29% easier
** Union City: 30%
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Current Policies
+ Thirty four percent consider the U.S. decision to send
rafters to Guantanamo was the correct decision to be made at
the time.
** Dade County: 36%
** Union City: 32%
f Eighty three percent feel that now the Guantanamo and
Panama camp residents should be allowed to come to the U.S.
** Dade County: 83%
** Union City: 83%
_ Sixty two percent favor the recently imposed travel
restrictions to the island.
** Dade County: 66%
** Union City: 53%
+ Fifty six percent favor the recently imposed restrictions
on sending money to relatives on the island.
** Dade County: 59%
** Union City: 52%
+ Forty percent feel that resuming normal relations with Cuba
will be good for Florida's economy.
** Dade County: 46%
** Union City: 29%
+ Seventy five percent feel that the U.S. invasion of Haiti
was a good thing.
** Dade County: 77%
** Union City: 70%
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE
As can be expected from such a large sample, the demographic
characteristics of the sample accurately represent the
characteristics of the Cuban-American population in Dade County and
Union city.
* 49.2 percent of the sample is male.
** Dade County: 49%
** Union City: 50%
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* 88 percent of respondents were born in Cuba and the
remainder are children of at least one Cuban parent.
** Dade County: 87.7%
** Union City: 88.3%
+ Median age of sample is 45 years old. (All respondents were
over 18 years of age.)
** Dade County: 46
** Union City: 43
* 47 percent of respondents have a family income under
$30,000.
** Dade County: 45.7%
** Union City: 50.8%
* 51 percent of the respondents are high school graduates.
** Dade County: 48%
** Union City: 56%
* 37 percent are registered Republicans and 11 percent are
registered Democrats but 43 percent are not registered to
vote.
** Dade County: 40% Republicans; 8% Democrats; 45% not
registered.
** Union City: 31% Republicans: 16% Democrats; 41% not
registered.
* 87.5 percent of the sample was white with 1.6 percent
reporting to be Black and 5 percent reporting to be Mulatto.
** Dade County: 90.8% white; .8% Black; 3.7% Mulato
** Union City: 81% white; 3.2% Black; 8.7% Mulato
* 16 percent of the Cuban born sample left the island before
1959, 38% arrived between 1959 and 1969, 13% arrived in the
decade of the 1970s, 25% arrived between 1980 and 1989 with
a majority of these (14%) arriving in 1980 and 8% have
arrived since 1990.
DADE UNION CITY
Before 1959 17% 14%
1959-1969 41% 32%
1970-1979 12% 17%
1980-1989 22% 28%
1990-1995 8% 9%
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DISCUSSION
In this poll, for the first time we can measure the
similarities and differences between the New Jersey and the Dade
County Cuban-American communities. It is axiomatic that the 
New
Jersey community is more liberal, as measured by party affiliation,
and less dogmatic than the Southern Florida community. This "common
knowledge" has been espoused for years. Yet, New Jersey served 
as
the spawning ground of the Torricelli Bill and Representative Bob
Menendez is indistinguishable from Diaz-Balart or Ros-Lehtinen on
positions towards Cuba. This poll allows us to tease 
out some of
these contradictions and put both communities in context.
Clearly there is near unanimity regarding certain issues,
such as opposition to the Castro regime and support of human rights
groups on the island. Yet, evidence suggests that on 
the issue of
specific policy options toward Cuba, respondents may 
express a
diversity of positions. Many respondents express support for
positions regarded as hard line as well as those associated 
with a
softer or more conciliatory stance. For example, sixty eight
percent support starting negotiations with the Cuban government 
to
facilitate peaceful, democratic change by means of elections or
plebiscite, while fifty seven percent favor military action by the
exile community against the Cuban government. Obviously, some
respondents favor both of these strategies. While these positions
might seem contradictory, they reflect an openness to supporting a
wide range of strategies that might bring about changes in Cuba.
By looking at breakdown by region of the responses above,
some obvious differences emerge between the Dade and Union City
respondents. At first blush, the Union City respondents. seem to
support negotiated solutions more strongly.
In fact, by running a simple chi-square statistical test, one
can verify these impressions. Of the fifteen questions dealing
with policiy options towards Cuba, there is a statistically
significant difference between the Union City and Dade County
respondents in ten questions (at the .01 level of significance.)
This indicates that the resulting difference is 95% certain not to
be based on chance. Any relationship at the .01 level is
considered to be strongly significant. On these eleven issues, one
can be fairly secure in assuming that there exists real differences
of opinion between the two populations.
The Carrot and the Stick
What does this indicate about the differences or similarities
between the two communities? In both communities there is a large
minority that combines soft and hard lines in what appears to be a
strategy of change. This group appears, in fact, to be saying "the
only way to deal with the Cuban government is by applying all the
pressure possible, while leaving a door open for negotiations."
Both communities exhibit this carrot and stick approach to dealing
with the Cuban government. A sizeable portion of each community
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supports some pressure strategies as well as some negotiated
solutions. This tendency, however, is stronger in the New Jersey
community. Cuban-Americans in Union City are more likely to
support negotationed solutions, even when combining these with
pressure strategies.
Even when supporting violent solutions which both communities
do with statistically equal zeal, the New Jersey respondents are
more likely to also support some sort of negotiation strategy,
leading to the assumption that the threat of violence is seen as
the strongest stick possible to combine with the carrot of
negotiations.
The two regions are most similar in their support of human
rights groups. There is overwhelming support in both areas for
human rights issues and activists on the island.
Dade Over Time: The Less Things Change...
As Table 1 shows, the Cuban-American community in Dade County
taken as a whole, has maintained a surprisingly steady position
when considering policy options toward Cuba. What changes do occur
can be explained by the anticipation of change, which was palpably
high in 1991, and the ensuing frustration when the expectations did
not materialize. In the polls taken in 1991, there was a
measurable sense of change in the air and the airwaves of Miami.
The events transforming the socialist block were seen as harbingers
of what would soon occur in Cuba. In this climate of inevitable
victory, the hard lines became less dramatic and more conciliatory.
Talk of "one people" and of "one struggle" to rebuild a destroyed
economy were common, even among the most recalcitrant anti-Castro
foes. That, indeed, was the point: one.could look beyond Castro
for the first time in thirty years. His days were numbered and the
count down had begun.
In this climate, the community became almost forgiving. In
our second survey of 1991, we measured relatively high responses
for most negotiation questions. Even the dreaded D word registered
a near majority support (49.7%) since engaging in a dialogue with
a dying regime seemed more acceptable. In addition, the steady
flow of travelers from Miami to Havana reported the sufferings of
a people, most of whom were relatives of someone in Miami.
While any close observer of the social, political and
economic climate of the island can detect marked changes, to most
of the Cuban American population, these changes are cosmetic and
far short of those expected. The 1993 Poll measured the frustration
of a community now more eager than ever to apply whatever sanctions
are necessary to topple the Castro government. Thus, negotiated
solutions declined in support while the harder lines were
emphasized.
The frustration is evident in this poll as well. Respondents
no longer anticipate changes but they continue to exhibit
flexibility of approaches to encourage change.
15
METHODOLOGY
From February 7 to March 14, 1504 Cuban-Americans in Dade
County, Florida and Union City, New Jersey were asked a battery of
questions about their support of policies toward Cuba. While the
survey was slightly restructured to allow for a more complete
measurement of the sources of information that respondents relied
upon to receive news about Cuba, the questions asked were the same
as those asked in the initial survey. The ten minute questionnaire
was a result of careful planning and design to insure that all
attitudes about the diverse policies towards Cuba existing in the
Cuban-American community could be expressed and recorded.
A random sample was generated from telephone exchanges in Dade
County and Union City using standard random-digit-dialing
procedures which ensure that each residential phone has an equal
chance of being chosen for the sample. In Union City, the 1990
census tracts with the highest Cuban population were targeted. In
addition, the sample was stratified according to Hispanic residence
patterns in both regions. Bilingual (Spanish/English) interviewers
conducted the interviews from IPOR'S 16-station telephone lab at
the North Miami Campus of Florida International University. The
margin of error for the full sample of 1504 is +/-2.5% at the 95%
confidence level (Dade sample: +/- 3%; Union City sample: +/-4.4%
This means, for example, that for the result that forty six
percent of the 1504 respondents favor the establishing of a
national dialogue, the chances are 95 out of 100 that the opinion
of the entire Cuban-American population in the two areas will fall
between 43.4 and 48.6 percent in favor of'this position.
HOW TO READ THE TABLES IN THIS REPORT
The answers to the questions appear in frequency and cross-
tabulation tables, which have counts and column percentages. The
frequency tables, which appear first, show the number of times each
response to a question was given. For questions where it is
possible to collapse the responses into broader categories, two
sets of frequency tables are included. Please note that the tables
for the collapsed responses eliminate certain types of responses
from the percentage calculations, so care should be taken in the
review and citing of data.
Some respondents spontaneously answered that they could not
support a particular policy as long as Fidel and/or Raul Castro
were in power in Cuba. This response appears separately in the
full response-set tables, but is included in the "oppose" answers
in the collapsed response tables.
There are also two sets--full response and collapsed-response--
of cross-tabulation tables. The cross-tabulation tables break down
the responses by demographic groups including age, income, gender,
political party, and by position on dialogue with Cuba.
Caution is advised in the use of percentages for subgroups found
in the cross-tabulation tables. The margin of error changes with
the size of the group on which a percentage is based. Thanks to
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TAn"E 1
Policy Favor Favor Favor Favor Favor Favor
1991 1991 1993 1995 1995 1995
arh Oetobew A1 Dads U City
supporting human rights
groups inside Cuba 90.3% 91.0% 90.4% 92.0% 91.7% 92.6%
Tightening the trade embargo
against Cuba 86.6% 87.5% 84.8% 81.5% 83.9% 76.7%
Increasing international
economic pressure 85.4% 89.5% 87.1% 84.2% 86.3% 80.0%
U.S. Support of armed internal
rebellion 85.0% 77.5% 77.2% 73.6% 74.1% 72.5%
Negotiations on human rights
in Cuba 83.9% 83.6% 77.5% 81.9% 79.9% 86.3%
Support for military action
by the exile community 76.3% 73.1% 72.8% 73.0% 73.3% 72.3%
Current policy--no diplomatic
relations and no trade 76.2% 80.4% 79.9% 73.4% 77.2% 65.9%
Allowing family members to
come to the U.S. 75.9% 71.3% 76.9% 83.1% 80.2% 88.9%
A U.S. invasion of Cuba 62.6% 53.8% 60.1% 57.2% 58.7% 54.1%
Negotiations for peacefulI democratic change 62.4% 66.2% 55.6% 68.5% 63.4% 78.6%
Direct dialing by phone to
Cuba 61.7% 64.2% 51.7% 67.6% 64.6% 73.5%
Allowing Cuban-Americans un-
restricted rights to travel
to Cuba 45.3% 49.7% 40.4% 43.1% 36.7% 55.8%
Dialogue 39.8% 49.3% 43.0% 46.0% 40.4% 5.s%
Allowing companies to sell
food and medicine to Cuba 37.8 N/A N/A N/A N A N A
Allowing companies to sell
food to Cuba N/A N/A 23.4% 33.7% 28.2, 44.-L
Allowing companies to sell
medicine to Cuba NA NA 49.8% 64.6% 61.'% 70.56
Allowing unrestricted trade
.ith Cuba 28.0% 24.7% 19.6% 23.54 18.34 34.1%
Notes
The 1991 and 1993 polls were conducted only in Dade County with a sample of 600 respondents. The margin of error of these
surveys is plus or minus 4%. The margin of error for the 1995 Dade sample of 1002 is plus or minus 3%. This means that to be
951 statistically certain that a real shift has occurred in the attitudes of Cuban-Americans in Dade, there should be a
separation of 7% between any specific response in the Dade surveys conducted in 1991-1993 and 1995.
In the collapsed frequency tables for all surveys, the percentage of respondents who favor a position is calculated by collapsing
the "strongly favor" and "mostly favor" categories into "favor." This is the response that is presented here. The oppose
category is calculated by collapsing the "mostly oppose" and "strongly oppose" categories into "oppose". "Don't know" and "No
answer" responses are considered missing values In the collapsed frequency tables.
